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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
precedential value, the Court's decision not to take the case has
been viewed as a silent endorsement of the anti-growth statute,
possibly resulting in a profusion of such statutes among smaller
communities in the near future."
If Warth and Petaluma are any indication of the Court's atti-
tude toward the merits of those cases, Metropolitan Housing may
well be reversed as a misapplication of the equal protection clause.
Such a reversal, however, would be a mistake and a serious blow to
the chances of equitable treatment of minority housing needs. What
is needed is guidance for communities and courts in the application
of equal protection to the zoning area-a topic the Court has not
directly addressed in the 50 years since Euclid.7 If communities are
to be able to plan effectively for their growth, especially for the
housing needs of those desiring to live in them, they cannot be
fettered by the compelling state interest test. At the same time, low
and moderate income classes, minority and otherwise, must be
planned for in those housing needs. The courts must therefore have
the tools to force communities to accept their fair share of the re-
gional housing needs when they do not do so on their own. The
Supreme Court's review of Metropolitan Housing is an excellent
opportunity to provide the necessary guidance to the lower courts.
RAYMOND M. PAETZOLD
The Right To Treatment Case-That Wasn't
In 1957 Kenneth Donaldson was civilly committed to a state
hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida for "care, maintenance, and
treatment" as a "paranoid schizophrenic."' For nearly 15 years
Donaldson demanded his release, claiming that he was neither dan-
gerous nor mentally ill, and that he was receiving no treatment. But
his requests for release were continually denied by the hospital su-
46. The Miami Herald, Feb. 25, 1976, § A, at 15, col. 1. See 5 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 485
(1975), noting Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal.
1974).
47. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
1. Donaldson, who had been suffering from delusions, was committed by his father
pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 394.22(11) (1955) (repealed by Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-131, effective
July 1, 1972). Essentially the Act provided that a mentally incompetent person who requires




perintendent, Dr. O'Connor.2 In struggling to obtain his freedom,
Donaldson had even instituted a number of court actions.3 In an
action instituted in February 1971, Donaldson sued O'Connor and
other members of the hospital staff on the ground that they had
intentionally and maliciously deprived him of his constitutional
right to liberty.' Although Donaldson had already gained his re-
lease, ' the jury returned a verdict for both compensatory and puni-
tive damages against O'Connor. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed.' On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
held, vacated and remanded: A state's confinement of a nondanger-
ous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom, by
himself or with the help of friends, violates such individual's consti-
tutional right to liberty. The case was remanded to the fifth circuit
solely to consider whether the judge's failure to instruct the jury as
to the legal implications of O'Connor's claimed good faith defense
2. There were two basic procedures for releasing patients. The first, a competency dis-
charge, resulted from a staff conference and a determination by a majority of the medical
staff that the patient had regained competency. The second was a procedure involving "trial
visits" or "furloughs" to the outside world for gradually lengthened periods of time. This
procedure did not require a staff conference and a determination of restoration of competency
as conditions precedent to release.
3. The number of cases brought by Kenneth Donaldson has been estimated at between
15 and 20. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 14, O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Reply Brief for Petitioner].
4. Donaldson alleged that the state hospital officials had deprived him of his constitu-
tional right to liberty since they knew he was not dangerous to himself nor to others, yet they
had not restored him to liberty by either treatment or release. Therefore, he sued under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
The original complaint, filed as a class action on the behalf of Donaldson and fellow
patients at Chattahoochee, requested damages, habeas corpus release, and declaratory and
injunctive relief requiring treatment. The district court dismissed the class action after Don-
aldson's release as he was no longer a member of the class. He filed his first amended
complaint on August 30, 1971 seeking damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief. Donald-
son v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 512 (5th Cir. 1974), af'd, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
5. Donaldson was eventually given a competency discharge under the authority of the
new hospital superintendent who replaced O'Connor shortly after O'Connor retired in 1971.
Brief for Respondent at 22 n.16, O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Respondent].
Donaldson's release did not moot the case, as it was still necessary to decide whether
O'Connor was liable for damages for violating Donaldson's constitutional rights. See note 4
supra and accompanying text.
6. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974).
19761
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
that his actions were based on state law,7 rendered inadequate the
instructions as to O'Connor's liability for compensatory and puni-
tive damages.' O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975)."
The Supreme Court had previously established due process
rights for mentally ill persons committed to an institution. In
Jackson v. Indiana,"' the Court found violative of due process the
indefinite commitment of a mentally defective deaf-mute solely
because he was incompetent to stand trial. The Court stated, "At
the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of com-
mitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the
individual is committed";" otherwise, there is an unconstitutional
7. Neither court below had acted with the benefit of the recent Supreme Court ruling
which defined the scope of qualified immunity for state officials. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975). Prior to Strickland, the doctrine of sovereign immunity might have prevented a
suit against a state official. In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), the Court held that the
plaintiffs could not recover damages from individual police officers for an unconstitutional
arrest if the officers were acting in good faith and believed that the arrest was constitutional.
Thus, if O'Connor could show that he had acted in good faith, even though Donaldson's
confinement was unconstitutional, he might have escaped liability.
Strickland, however, held that a school board member is not immune from liability for
damages under section 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he
took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the
student affected, or if he took the action with a malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury to the student.
Thus, if O'Connor knew or reasonably should have known that he was violating Donald-
son's constitutional rights, or if he acted maliciously to violate them, under Strickland he
would be liable in a section 1983 action.
8. The oral charge to the jury included the following instructions as to O'Connor's guilt:
[The Plaintiff must establishl [tlhat the Defendants confined Plaintiff against
his will, knowing that he was not mentally ill or dangerous or knowing that if
mentally ill he was not receiving treatment for his alleged mental illness.
Brief for Respondent at 39 (emphasis in original).
It is important to note that the Court in Strickland held that a compensatory award
would be appropriate only if an official acted with such an "impermissible motivation or with
such disregard of the student's clearly established constitutional rights that his action cannot
reasonably be characterized as being in good faith." Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322
(1975).
Thus, it would appear that although good faith might not be a defense to the action if
O'Connor knew or reasonably should have known he was violating Donaldson's constitutional
rights, the good faith doctrine may nevertheless be utilized to limit or escape liability from
damages. The official is still not "charged with predicting the future course of constitutional
law." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
The jury should have been charged to consider the question of "good faith" on the part
of O'Connor in reference to his liability for compensatory and punitive damages.
9. The decision was unanimous; Chief Justice Burger, however, in his concurring
opinion, expressed his disagreement with several issues decided by the fifth circuit.
10. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
11. Id. at 738.
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deprivation of liberty. The Court followed the Jackson decision in
McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution2 where it was held that
confining a person for an indeterminate period of observation to
determine whether he would be permanently committed was viola-
tive of due process.
Although the Court in Jackson and McNeil recognized that due
process required a rational relationship between the nature and
duration of commitment and the purpose for commitment, it did
not focus on whether there was a constitutional right to receive post-
commitment treatment. Prior to Donaldson, there had been a grow-
ing movement urging the constitutional right to treatment for per-
sons involuntarily confined in mental institutions."' Although en-
couraged by the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Donaldson on the basis of
a constitutional right to treatment, the movement was thwarted by
the Supreme Court's decision in this case.
Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court did not find it
necessary to deal with " 'the far reaching question whether the Four-
teenth Amendment guarantees a right to treatment to persons in-
voluntarily civilly committed to state mental hospitals.' "" The
Court viewed the question before it more narrowly, noting that:
[Tlhere is no reason now to decide whether mentally ill persons
dangerous to themselves or to others have a right to treatment
12. 407 U.S. 245 (1972).
13. Various legal commentators urged this view. See, e.g., Bazelon, Implementing the
Right to Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 742 (1969); Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46
A.B.A.J. 499 (1960); Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practi-
cal Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1108 (1972); Robitscher, The
Right to Psychiatric Treatment: A Social -Legal Approach to the Plight of the State Hospital
Patient, 18 VILL. L. REV. 11 (1972); Symposium-The Right to Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 673
(1969); Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of the Civilly Committed Mental Patients
to Adequate Treatment, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1282 (1973); Note, The Rights of the Mentally Ill
During Incarceration: The Developing Law, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 494 (1973). But see Katz, The
Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction? 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 755 (1969).
Furthermore, various state and federal courts supported the movement. See, e.g., Welsch
v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D.
Ill. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). But see N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Burnham v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 349 F.
Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972). See also In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (1).C. Cir. 1973); Martarella
v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), enforced, 359 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
United States v. Walker, 335 F. Supp. 705 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous,
33 N.Y.2d 161, 305 N.E.2d 903, 350 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1973); In re I, 316 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Family
Ct. 1970).
14. 422 U.S. at 572, quoting Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 509 (5th Cir. 1974).
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upon compulsory confinement by the State, or whether the State
may compulsorily confine a nondangerous, mentally ill individ-
ual for the purpose of treatment."
Since the "jury found that Donaldson was neither dangerous to
himself nor dangerous to others, and al'o found that, if mentally ill,
Donaldson had not received treatment,"' " the issue was limited to
whether, under these circumstances, Donaldson was entitled to
damages for the failure of the state officials to release him. The
stated purpose for the confinement was treatment; therefore the
Jackson and McNeil rationale required that treatment, in fact, be
provided so that the confinement would bear a reasonable relation
to its purpose. The Court decided that without such reasonable
relation, no justification existed for keeping Donaldson in continued
confinement."'
Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion, on the other hand,
focused on the constitutional right to treatment not discussed by the
majority. He agreed that Donaldson should not have been confined,
given the jury's findings that he was not dangerous to himself nor
to others, and that he received no treatment. However, the Chief
Justice rejected the Fifth Circuit's holding and stated that the Fifth
Circuit's analysis had "no basis in the decisions of this court."'"
Expanding the law, the Fifth Circuit had held that "a person
involuntarily civilly committed to a state mental hospital has a
constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give
him a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental
condition."'' Recognizing that civil commitment entails a "massive
curtailment of liberty,"2" the court of appeals formulated a two-part
theory supporting the conclusion that the due process clause guar-
antees a right to treatment.
15. Id. at 573. Donaldson had contended that providing treatment was the purpose
justifying his initial confinement. However, he did not challenge the mode of treatment nor
whether treatment would be a permissible purpose to justify confinement. He chose to show
the absence of a rational relationship between the purpose for his confinement and the nature
of his confinement by demonstrating that he was receiving no treatment and, in fact, no
longer needed treatment to function in society. Thus, the permissibility of the treatment
purpose or the mode of treatment by one confined under the treatment rationale, were not
issues before the Court in this case.
16. 422 U.S. at 573.
17. Id. at 575.
18. Id. at 580 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
19. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added).
20. Id., citing Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
[Vol. 30:486
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Commitment of individuals has been justified under the police
power of the states as necessary to protect society from dangerous
mental defectives,"' or under the parens patriae rationale where the
state's interest is theoretically beneficent." The court of appeals in
Donaldson focused initially on the parens patriae rationale which
justified confinement in a state mental institution for nondangerous
individuals. Under this rationale, the "due process clause requires
that minimally adequate treatment be in fact provided""z so that
there is a rational relationship between the basis for the confine-
ment and the nature of it.
Secondly, the Fifth Circuit supported its right-to-treatment
view by acknowledging the quid pro quo theory:24 involuntary con-
finement violates the due process right to liberty; hence, violation
of the right must be justified by a compelling state interest. If a
person has not committed an anti-social act or has not been found
to be "dangerous," the police power rationale of incarceration, i.e.,
to protect society, cannot serve as the compelling state interest. If
the nondangerous person is confined, it must be for treatment; if
treatment is the compelling state interest which justifies the con-
finement, then the patient must receive it."'
According to the Fifth Circuit, this quid pro quo theory for the
mental health area was derived from the rationale expounded in
previous cases involving non-penal detention." The Fifth Circuit
21. See Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 742 (1969).
22. See generally Comment, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Men-
tally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190 (1974).
23. 493 F.2d at 521.
24. Id. at 522.
25. Brief for Respondent at 59.
26. The relevant cases have arisen in five major procedural contexts..
First, where detention is "non-penal" in theory, the minimim requirement is that the
persons be confined in a non-prison facility. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 522-23 (5th
Cir. 1974), citing Benton v. Reid, 231 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1956) and Commonwealth v. Page,
339 Mass. 313, 159 N.E.2d 82 (1959).
Second, persons held under "non-penal" detention must be placed in facilities where
conditions are classified as actually therapeutic. Id. at 523, citing Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281
F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Fahy, J., concurring) and Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 517
(4th Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted sub nom. Murel v. Baltimore City
Crim. Ct., 407 U.S. 355 (1972).
Third, "non-penal" statutes providing for confinement of sex offenders and defective
delinquents are constitutional if there is the realization of the stautory promise of rehabilita-
tive treatment. Id., citing Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 517 (4th Cir. 1964) cert. dismissed
as improvidently granted sub nom. Murel v. Baltimore City Crim. Ct., 407 U.S. 355 (1974)
and Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
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concluded that "these . . . [previous] cases constitute a near
unanimous recognition that governments must afford a quid pro quo
when they confine citizens in circumstances where the conventional
limitations of the criminal process are inapplicable." 7
The Chief Justice's initial criticism was directed at the Fifth
Circuit's failure to explain its conclusion that Donaldson had been
committed because he needed treatment. He stated:
The Florida Statutes in effect during the period of [Donaldson's]
confinement did not require that a person who had been adjudi-
cated incompetent and ordered committed either be provided
with psychiatric treatment or released, and there was no such
condition in [Donaldson's] order of commitment.
More importantly, Burger stated that the instructions did not
require the jury to make any findings regarding the specific reasons
for confinement or to focus on any rights Donaldson may have had
under state law. The validity of this criticism is questionable since
the jury, before finding for Donaldson, first must have found that
he was not dangerous to himself or others and that O'Connor knew
of his nondangerous character. The jury had been so instructed by
the trial court:
Now, the purpose of involuntary hospitalization is treatment and
not mere custodial care or punishment if a patient is not a danger
to himself or others. Without such treatment there is no justifica-
tion from a constitutional standpoint for continued confinement
unless you should also find that the Plaintiff was dangerous either
to himself or others.2 9
Thus, the court of appeals could reasonably assume that the
evidence showed that Donaldson was not dangerous to himself or
others, and thus that he was confined under the parens patriae
Fourth, patients claiming that they were not receiving treatment and who were challeng-
ing their confinement must at least have a hearing to determine the validity of their claims.
Id., citing Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) and Nason v. Superintendent of
Bridgewater State Hosp., 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968).
Fifth, other cases involved class action suits which sought broad injunctive and declara-
tory relief requiring that adequate treatment be provided in state-run facilities. Id. at 524,
citing Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Ader-
holt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) and Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill.
1973).
27. 493 F.2d at 524.
28. 422 U.S. at 581 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
29. Brief for Respondent at 40.
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rationale rather than the police power rationale. The Fifth Circuit,
in fact, took this position. :"'
Chief Justice Burger further concluded that the court of ap-
peals had interpreted the parens patriae rationale as limiting the
state's power to confine a nondangerous mentally ill person solely
to situations where the patient would be provided treatment." He
claimed, however, that this interpretation was "of very recent ori-
gin," and found "no historical basis for imposing such a limitation
on state power.": 2 His reasoning was based on the notion "that in
the exercise of its police power a State may confine individuals
solely to protect society from the dangers of significant antisocial
acts or communicable disease."" '
This argument would be valid if it were applied to dangerous
individuals who were committed under the police power to protect
others from harm. However, the Fifth Circuit specifically limited its
holding to nondangerous patients, and thus the initial commitment
would flow from the parens patriae rationale, not from the police
power rationale. Furthermore, the criticism is contrary to the rea-
soning in many recent decisions which have acknowledged that cus-
todial confinement without treatment raises "substantial" constitu-
tional issues."
Secondly, Chief Justice Burger attacked the quid pro quo
theory as propounded by the Fifth Circuit. Due process, he rea-
soned, is not an "inflexible concept"; its requirements are deter-
mined "in particular instances by identifying and accommodating
the interests of the individual and society. '" ' Furthermore, the quid
pro quo theory was defective because it "presupposes that essen-
tially the same interests are involved in every situation where a
state seeks to confine an individual .3
However, it is difficult to conceive of valid interests involved
beyond those of restoring the nondangerous mentally ill person's
30. 493 F.2d at 521.
31. 422 U.S. at 581 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
32. Id. at 582.
33. Id. at 582-83.
34. McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 250 (1972). See also Murel v.
Baltimore City Crim. Ct., 407 U.S. 355, 357-58 (1972) (the commitment of a "defective
delinquent" should be reviewed in terms of the criteria, procedure, and treatment provided);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22-23 n.30 (1967).
35. 422 U.S. at 585-86 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
36. Id. at 586.
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competency and of returning him to society. The "treatment" may
vary from case to case, but the "treatment" is not the purpose for
the confinement. The purpose for the confinement of a nondanger-
ous patient is to cure or improve his condition; treatment is merely
a means to that end. Thus, the state's interest in each case of invol-
untary commitment of a nondangerous patient is essentially the
same-not different as Chief Justice Burger would maintain. The
state must provide treatment to a nondangerous person for a consti-
tutionally valid relationship to exist between the compelling state
interest, which justified the initial commitment, and the nature of
the confinement. :7 Justice Burger concluded this argument by stat-
ing:
Given the present state of medical knowledge regarding abnormal
human behavior and its treatment, few things would be more
fraught with peril than to irrevocably condition a State's power
to protect the mentally ill upon the providing of "such treatment
as will give [themi a realistic opportunity to be cured." Nor can
I accept the theory that a State may lawfully confine an individ-
ual thought to need treatment and justify that deprivation of
liberty solely by providing some treatment. :"
There is no doubt that Chief Justice Burger is correct in his
conclusion that there is a "wide divergence of medical opinion re-
garding the diagnosis of and proper therapy for mental abnormali-
ties. ' He apparently reasons that this divergence of medical opin-
ion makes the right to treatment, in effect, judicially unenforcea-
ble."' However, Judge Bazelon addressed in a recent article, the
issue of whether a judge could prescribe or evaluate treatment
modes for the mentally ill, writing:
No judge would claim the ability to prescribe a particular therapy
for a "chronic undifferentiated schizophrenic." But neither would
any judge allocate AM frequencies to avoid interference. . . .To
focus more closely upon the right to treatment, the judge must
decide only whether the patient is receiving carefully chosen ther-
apy which respectable professional opinion regards as within the
37. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
38. 422 U.S. 588-89 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
39. Id. at 587. See generally Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 12 (1950); Ennis & Litwach,
Ps 'chiatr, and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L.
R;v. 693 (1974).
40. 422 U.S. at 587 (Burger, CA., concurring).
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range of appropriate treatment alternatives, not whether the pa-
tient is receiving the best of all possible treatment in the best of
all possible mental hospitals.'
The right to treatment does not mean that a judge must require
a guarantee that the patient, in fact, be cured." It is therefore sub-
mitted that Chief Justice Burger erroneously stated that the court
of appeals' decision should be read to "irrevocably condition a
State's power to protect the mentally ill upon the providing of 'such
treatment as will give [them] a realistic opportunity to be
cured.' "': Under the court of appeals' reasoning, persons who are
beyond rehabilitation need not be guaranteed treatment that will
cure them. As the Fifth Circuit noted, it is only necessary that the
person receive "treatment as will give him a reasonable opportunity
to be cored or to improve his mental condition."44
The Supreme Court's decision in Donaldson was enthusiasti-
cally received by the media when it was announced." Although no
longer heralded as the "right to treatment case," the Court's ruling
was hailed as a "landmark legal victory in the effort to oppose
involuntary commitment of mental patients" by the New York Civil
Liberties Union." This enthusiasm, however, is ill-founded. First, it
has been suggested that one of the implications of the case is that
41. Bazelon, supra note 21, at 745.
42. The following guidelines for defining the right to treatment have emerged:
First, judicial enforcement of the right has not, thus far, required doctors to
demonstrate that a particular course of treatment would cure or improve the
patient's mental condition, but only to show that there was a bona fide effort and
a reasonable opportunity to cure or improve that condition. See, e.g., Rouse v.
Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 456-57 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp.
781, 785, a/f'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (1974).
Second, courts have allowed state authorities broad discretion, within the range
of present knowledge, in their efforts to treat the mentally ill. Rouse v. Cameron,
373 F.2d 451, 456 (government authorities have an obligation to provide treatment
that comes within the range of "present knowledge").
Third, courts have not required state officials to provide the "best possible treat-
ment" but only treatment that is "adequate" or "reasonable" within the range
of accepted professional practice. Tribbey v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 104, 105 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); In re Jones, 338 F. Supp. 428, 429 (D.D.C. 1972) (additional citations
omitted).
Brief for Respondent at 65-66.
43. 422 U.S. at 588-89 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
44. 493 F.2d at 520.
45. "The ruling appeared likely to force the ultimate release from mental institutions of
thousands of . . . patients regarded as untreated, harmless and not likely to become com-
munity charges." N.Y. Times, June 27, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
46. !d. at 36, col. 3.
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"states will have to adopt meaningful procedures for periodic review
of those people involuntarily confined.""
This statement may not accurately portray the effect of
Donaldson in that even if states must provide for periodic review of
a patient's condition, a mere summary examination by a physician
would probably suffice. If the same doctor is involved in each in-
stance, the practical effect is that there would be no action taken
without a court battle. For Donaldson to have substantial impact,
courts must specify clear guidelines for implementing the periodic
review in a truly meaningful manner.
Secondly, the greatest ramification of Donaldson is that hospi-
tal administrators and doctors may be put on notice of possible
liability for damages for confining a nondangerous patient who is
receiving no treatment. However, the patient would still have to
prove that he was "nondangerous." This may be a difficult, if not
impossible task considering that even psychiatrists often cannot
accurately predict who is dangerous and who is not."8 Thus, a psy-
chiatrist may claim that in his "professional judgment" the patient
was "dangerous"; thereby relieving a hospital official who relied on
such diagnosis from liability.
At the present time, there is no way of knowing exactly how
many nondangerous patients in state mental institutions are receiv-
ing only custodial care; therefore, it is impossible to gauge accur-
ately the practical effects of this decision. The problems involved
in ascertaining "dangerousness" would seem to indicate that a
meaningful decision regarding the right to treatment would have to
delineate, at least, a method for objectively judging "dangerous-
ness" as it relates to the question of the basis for confinement and
subsequent treatment.
The Supreme Court chose not to deal with the right to treat-
ment question in its decision. It is fortunate, though, that no death
47. The Mental Health Law Project, Summary of Activities 9 (Sept. 1975).
48. One psychiatrist has noted that there is no empirical support for the
belief that psychiatrists can predict dangerous behavior. To the contrary, even
with "the most careful, painstaking.., approach to the prediction of dangerous-
ness, false positives may be at a minimum of 60 to 70%." In other words, even
under controlled conditions, at least 60 to 70 percent of the people whom psychia-
trists judge to be dangerous may, in fact, be harmless.
Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CAL,. L. REV. 693, 714 (1974) (citations omitted).
49. See note 14 supra, and accompanying text.
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blow to the constitutional right to treatment was delivered by the
majority of the Court, but only attempted by Chief Justice Burger
in his concurring opinion.
Although a state could easily justify, by means of its police
power, the retention of "dangerous" persons, those who are only
receiving "treatment" such as "milieu therapy"5" continue to face
the prospect of confinement for an indeterminate period of time. At
the very least, such patients should be afforded the right to a good
faith effort of treatment so that those who respond favorably to such
treatment may be returned to society. Unfortunately, the specific
holding of Donaldson does nothing to alleviate their plight. In fact,
under most state civil commitment statutes the treatment does not
have to be designed to improve their condition, nor are hospitals
obligated to provide an individual treatment plan."
Certainly not all problems involving confinement of individuals
in state mental institutions would be solved if the Court were to hold
that one has a constitutional right to treatment. However, if the
right to treatment were given a constitutional basis, the public
would become acutely aware of the problems currently existing in
mental hospitals. The public indignation2 could serve as a needed
catalyst for state legislatures to grant the mental hospitals the funds
needed to comply with the prescribed standards for adequate
treatment that would be set by the courts. 3
50. "Milieu therapy" involves the patient's interacting with the environment or "milieu"
of the hospital. Doctors frequently rely on "milieu therapy" to rebut claims by patients that
they are receiving inadequate treatment. Halpern, A Practicing Lawyer Views the Right to
Treatment, 57 GEO. L.J. 782, 786-87 n.19 (1969).
51. See generally Comment, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Men-
tall' Ill, 87 H~Av. L. REV. 1190 (1974).
The importance of an individual treatment plan has been stated as follows:
The need for an individualized treatment plan cannot be overemphasized. With-
out such a plan, there can be no evidence that the hospital has singled out the
patient for treatment as an individual with his own unique problems. And unless
the plan is refined and improved . . . there can be no guarantee that the promise
of treatment has taken root in reality.
Bazelon, supra note 21, at 746.
52. "But once let rumor spread about a man or woman illegally committed to a mental
hospital and newspaper headlines will scream; the public will seethe with indignation; inves-
tigations and punitive expeditions will be demanded." A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN
AMERICA 418 (1st ed. 1937).
53. In too many cases, the efficacy of modern medicine is dependent upon a
legislative decision rather than upon medical knowledge. If the legislature appro-
priates sufficient funds ..., the effect of [commitment in a mental hospital] is
decided to a great extent by the limitations of medical knowledge. If the legisla-
1976]
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Until the right to treatment is deemed a constitutional right,
there are many persons who, lacking the tenacity and inner strength
of Kenneth Donaldson, will live their lives in exile; they will
wrongfully be exposed every day to an unremitting terror that may
only have the final effect of depriving them of whatever sanity they
might still possess. 4
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ture appropriates insufficient funds, the effect of institutionalization is decided
to a great extent by legislative fiat.
Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
54. It is, perhaps, appropriate at this point to quote from Kenneth Donaldson's testi-
mony concerning the conditions under which he was confined:
Q. Were you able to get a good night's sleep?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. On all the wards there was the same mixture of patients. There were some
patients who had fits during the night. There were some patients who would
torment other patients, screaming and hollering, and the fear, always the fear you
have in your mind, I suppose, when you go to sleep that maybe somebody will
jump on you during the night.
They never did, but you think about those things. It was a lunatic asylum.
493 F.2d at 512 n.5.
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